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ABSTRACT. A discussion of the imposition of the interests of the few on the 
collective through a subtle but effective manner: the eventual, complete 
development of Massive Open Online Courses. It is this article’s premise that this 
development together with current marketing efficacy and the present economic 
goals of modern democracies, is probable to result in a shrinkage of the market 
place of ideas and, paradoxically, likely to result in a diminution of democracy in 
the world.  
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1. Introduction: Society’s Desire for Independence 
 
The preservation of the individual’s unalienable rights and the supply of 
the security usurped by the mighty of a state of nature (hereinafter referred 
to as ‘Private Status’), are the primary objectives of a benign power 
arrangement. The active and perpetual balancing of these two goals is the 
pursuit of a just state. The people of democratic states established such 
aims when they voluntarily conferred their sovereignty to the institutions of 
government (hereinafter referred to as ‘Public Status’). Such transfer of 
power was and remains a manifestation of the people’s desire to progress 
towards a virtuous state.   
As reflected by the U.S. Constitution, this grand movement is taken 
with extreme prudence. First and foremost, the people wish to be secure 
from an eventual degenerate form of their very own creation. After all, the 
interests of those in power at the time of this progress are historically 
imposed upon the collective. Consequently, power is transferred to Public 
Status with the stipulation that the individual’s natural rights be infringed 
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only by adequate necessity. But, while the people’s pursuit of happiness 
begins with protection of the people’s natural rights from their very own 
institutions, the raison d’être of Public Status is to provide a framework 
within which civil rights, political rights and social rights may be ordained 
so to allow the pursuit. Private Status and the imposition of its interests 
upon the collective, then, remains the true antagonist of the aforementioned 
progress.    
However, in many matters of modern society the democratization of the 
state of nature has been left to the same underpinnings on which Private 
Status rested in a state of nature, the workings of a laissez fair based 
system. Ironically, the institutionalization and legitimization of such 
‘workings’ by Public Status has, in fact, created an unprecedented 
framework of economic opportunity. Like in a state of nature, however, 
such opportunities are rarely relevant to or exploitable by anyone other 
than Private Status.   
Current levels of disparity of exploitability have, ostensibly, reached 
intolerable levels for an organic society. In the movement from a state of 
nature to a state of virtue, Public Status has left scarcely attended the 
governance of several key economic and social issues. Orphans of 
legislation, most citizens have been left with general dissatisfaction and a 
desire for retribution.   
More specific to this paper is a discussion of the continuation of the 
imposition of the interests of Private Status on the collective by a subtler 
but effective manner: The eventual, complete development of Massive 
Open Online Courses (‘MOOCs’). It is this article’s premise that this 
development, together with current marketing efficacy and the present 
economic goals of Public Status, is, paradoxically, likely to result in a 
diminution of democracy in the world.    
 
2. What Are MOOCs? 
 
MOOCs1 are an extremely sophisticated form of distance learning 
(generally, at the undergraduate and graduate levels of education) (Fini 
2009). High quality video and audio stream to computer equipped students, 
simultaneously, artificial intelligence tools allow for instructor to student 
and student to student interaction, virtual laboratories and the submission 
and analysis of exam material (Daniel 2012). Institutions, including those 
generally considered to be elite, have requested their best professors to 
teach such courses.    
MOOCs are offered gratuitously or at heavily discounted prices. 
Regardless of the gratuity element, generally, the fixed costs of production 
remain the same whether the classes are offered to one student or to ten 
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million students. Consequently, the student cost of such courses (or 
degrees) is considerably less than conventional courses (or degrees); a 
seemingly good thing (Onink 2013).2 Simultaneously, the economies of 
scale make the proposition of MOOCs very lucrative to the institutions, 
another ostensibly good thing. In fact, it may be argued that the recent 
advent and importance placed on MOOCs stems from the need of 
institutions to raise funds (Vardi 2012).3   
Regardless of the reasons for their recent popularity, MOOCs are 
expected to grow (Lohr 2013) rapidly and lead to the education of millions 
of students around the world (Cohan 2012). The American Council on 
Education has moved quickly to certify some of the courses as credit-
worthy. Many other colleges are considering plans to award credit for 
MOOCs (Jaschik 2013).   
Coursera, the current leader in the new, online education industry, “has 
grown at warp speed to emerge as striving to support its business by 
creating revenue streams through licensing, certification fees and 
recruitment data provided to employers, among other efforts” (Lewin 
2013). Four months after Coursera became operative; its free college 
courses had drawn in a million users “a faster launching than either 
Facebook or Twitter” (Lewin 2013). The co-founders of Coursera, 
computer science professors at Stanford University, witnessed enrollment 
pass two million, with 70,000 new students a week signing up for over 200 
courses …taught by faculty members at the company’s partners, 33 elite 
universities. In less than a year, Coursera has attracted $22 million in 
venture capital Universities nationwide are increasing their online 
offerings, hoping to attract students around the world. Harvard and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology have each provided $30 million to 
create edX (Lewin 2013). Another Stanford spinoff, Udacity, has attracted 
more than a million students to its menu of massive open online courses, or 
MOOCs, along with $15 million in financing (Lewin 2013).  
 
3. The Inherent Dangers of MOOCs 
 
Given the massive potential for institutional profitability and the 
simultaneous benefit of lower costs to the student, the MOOCs movement 
is, ostensibly, inexorable. Inevitably, market forces are likely to continue to 
lead the elite institutions to be frontrunners in this market and to eventually 
offer students degrees at heavily discounted prices (Cusumano 2013). At a 
glance, these outcomes are irrefutable benefits which ought to and 
currently seem to be welcomed by both the student and the institution. 
A long-run assessment, however, sheds light on a problematic, 
prospective consequence. If the presently praised economies of scale allow 
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a student to attend an elite university at an extremely reduced cost, who 
will attend a lesser institution? Arguably, ceteris paribus, if the cost is 
similar, students are less likely to choose a less reputable institution over a 
more prestigious one; a construct applicable to millions of students seeking 
what seems to be the better education. Accordingly, considering that (1) the 
elite institutions are very few, (2) the number of the ‘best and brightest’ of 
each institutions is extremely limited, and (3) the potential world-wide 
students is in the millions, the paradigm become perilous:  unintended, self-
imposed, standardized higher education at a world-wide level. It is not 
unreasonably foreseeable that the popularity of MOOCs will increase to a 
point where a great majority of students (world-wide) will enroll in at least 
one transferable course or graduate from one of very few Ivy League 
universities offering MOOCs based degrees; leaving on the sidelines the 
less recognized institutions (Cusumano 2013). Either way, the result leaves 
few, elite educators to formulate and proliferate judgments for and to the 
masses (regarding a topic or a whole degree).  
Accordingly, in the near future a great majority of the workforce will 
have graduated from a handful of universities; having read the same texts, 
performed on the same exams, heeded to the same professor(s), learned the 
same substance, and even perceived the same eccentricities of those few 
professor(s). While, arguably, at the micro level, the single student may 
receive a good education, the macro outlook suggests a disconcerting 
result:  physicians, journalists, lawyers, political animals, all with the same 
thoughts, i.e., tyranny of the majority to a greater degree than historically 
contemplated. In light of this universal conformity, even Plato’s 
philosopher-kings would generate a mob of citizens which would make the 
aforementioned democratic progress halt.  
When one sees millions of people thinking the same thoughts and 
reading the same books, and perceives that as the multitude grows, its 
influence becomes always stronger, it is hard to imagine how new points of 
repulsion and contrast are to arise, new diversities of sentiment and 
doctrine to be developed (Bryce 1995). 
Such level of control (Rampini 2013) on the collective is the antithesis 
of democratic thought.  In fact, even if the handful of professors were to 
preach freedom of thought, without an opposing argument, the prayer will 
be stale and moot.4 And, of course, the perils escalate if the philosopher-
kings degenerate into demagogues and actually espouse views contrary to 
freedom of thought. 
Although MOOCs is not state action,5 the underpinnings of the 
rationale for freedom of speech rights apply to the present discussion. To 
borrow from doctrines of U.S. constitutional law, freedom of speech is 
intended to create a market place of ideas:  ‘[W]hen men have realized that 
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time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more 
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which 
their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our 
Constitution” (Abrams 1919). Simply put, generally, speech is protected 
only if any potential harms which may flow from it can be prevented 
(rebutted) by other speech (and not by force); “[i]t is not acceptable to 
uphold the right to use speech as a sword where no exchange of views is 
involved” (Tribe 1942).   
A competing idea must exist to test the validity of a premise. MOOCs 
will eliminate the counter positioning which allows for freedom of speech 
protection; they will turn the market economy of ideas into a planned 
economy of ideas.  
The constitutional right of free expression is…designed and intended to 
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting 
the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each 
of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more 
capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other 
approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice 
upon which our political system rests (Cohen 1971).   
The margin of utility of the millionth class of the same lecture is not an 
“essential part of any exposition of ideas, and [will be] of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality” 
(Chaplinsky 1942). 
The conformity created by MOOCs will percolate into the governance 
of democracies; what fosters democracy if not dialogue between competing 
sides? In the end, it is grossly paradoxical that the apparent democratization 
of education will adversely impact the democratic progress mentioned in 
the introduction; “[t]o be afraid of ideas.., is to be unfit for self-
government” (Meiklejohn 1948).    
‘[T]he First Amendment... has a structural role to play in securing and 
fostering our republican system of self-government … Implicit in this 
structural role is not only the principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,’ … but also the antecedent 
assumption that valuable public debate-as well as other civic behavior-must 
be informed. The structural model links the First Amendment to that 
process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus 
entails solicitude not only for communication itself, but for the 
indispensable conditions of meaningful communication (Richmond 1980).  
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De Tocqueville observed how the tyranny of the majority inhibits the 
freedom of thought, “[the] invisible and subtle power that mocks all the 
efforts of tyranny.” (De Tocqueville 1956) Almost two-hundred years later, 
MOOCs render his proposition regarding such tyranny much more likely 
(even though, ironically, originating at the other end of the spectrum, a 
tyranny of the oligarchy). The ‘invisible and subtle power’ is greatly 
curtailed by MOOCs, leaving the opening for the tyranny. 
The marketplace of ideas is what provides the democratic government 
the pool of information necessary to choose policy. If MOOCs grow as 
predicted, what antitrust guardians will protect the consumers of ideas in 
absence of opposing ideas? What legislation can prevent the restraint on 
freedom of ideas if only one idea exists? In absence of a market of ideas, 
that which is preached from a very small group of persons will seldom be 
questioned.   
A democratic curriculum emphasizes access to a wide range of 
information and the right of those of varied opinion to have their 
viewpoints heard. Educators in a democratic society have an obligation to 
help young people seek out a range of ideas and to voice their own. 
Unfortunately, many schools persistently shirk this obligation in several 
ways. First, they narrow the range of school-sponsored knowledge to what 
we might call ‘official’ or high-status knowledge that is produced or 
endorsed by the dominant culture. Second, they silence the voices of those 
outside the dominant culture (Apple and Beane 1995).  
 
4. Intensifying the Inherent Dangers of MOOCs:   
    The Goals of Public Status  
 
The apparent objective of Public Status is no longer the pursuit of a just 
state, as described in the introduction. In extrapolating the causality of 
current government policy, we find that modern Public Status is concerned 
primarily with aggregate productivity rather than the virtuous citizen.6   
“The science of politics…seeks an accurate description and 
classification of political institutions and a precise determination of the 
forces which create and control them” (Gettell 1945).  However, presently, 
comprehension of these ‘forces’ has become a purely economic matter.  
Political authority has come to define ‘general welfare’ solely as an 
economic term; accordingly, today’s state allocates much of its efforts to 
attaining economic goals: full employment, price stability, growth and 
income distribution.   
While political economics is a relatively young discipline (“economics 
is certainly not much more than two-hundred years old and as a profession 
bout 150 years old” [Uphoff and Warren 1972] the national expression has 
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become little more than an economic figure. Public Status has left 
governance to what periodically appears to generate the greatest numbers 
in the economic metric mentioned above, that is, Private Status. Thus, the 
macro-economic perspective has become the full time agenda of today’s 
political authority.   
Currently, the disconnect between the original objective of Public 
Status (i.e., the virtuous citizen) and modern economic objectives is 
epitomized by the divide between the voter and the technocratic 
governments. That is, the personal sovereignty offered by a democratic 
power structure is at odds with purely ‘economic leaders.’ For example, 
arguably, the frustration of the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement is its 
inability to understand the nomenclature and workings of present Public 
Status and its Private Status support structure (e.g., what is a derivative?  
How did it lead to a recession?). If these concepts constitute the clay of 
modern society, leaders cannot be elected by virtuous citizens, instead 
technocrats most be appointed. Such a nebulous movement (and similar 
ones, e.g., No-Global) is a reflection of the citizen’s loss of reference in 
light of incomprehensible government goals. Consequently, this general 
will is leaderless and inarticulate. Seemingly, its goal is to merely create a 
presence rather than to propose solutions (it cannot know what to propose).   
In the end, the citizen’s sovereignty and voice in government has slowly 
been usurped by the technicality of the economy, and more increasingly 
replaced with the purchasing election of a consumer.  
Given the nature of these macroeconomic goals (in a Constantine like 
manner) it is in Public Status’ interest to support and promote the 
development of MOOCs as its new religion. MOOCs, as stated above, are 
likely to wither away the dialogue, diversity and dissent, and replace the 
discontent with somnambulist disciples. A curtailment of the disgruntled 
makes governing more linear, consequently, facilitating the attainment of 
the aforementioned economic goals of the modern state. Nietzsche makes 
the following observation: “The governments of the great States have two 
instruments for keeping the people dependent, in fear and obedience: a 
coarser, the army, and a more refined, the school” (Levy 1974). 
This environment, as created by modern Public Status goals, increases 
the likelihood of the survival of only a few, elite institutions in the 
aftermath of the predicted growth of MOOCs, in turn, increasing the 
likelihood of a handful of professor instructing the millions.  
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5. Intensifying the Inherent Dangers of MOOCs:  
    Marketing and the Demand of the Modern Individual  
 
As suggested above, the citizen’s political sovereignty is being replaced 
with the consumer’s economic autonomy. While this economic freedom is 
desirable, consumer demand comes from an innate motivation for self-
preservation, which is perpetually in need of satisfaction. This acquisitive 
nature leaves the consumer forever wanting. Accordingly, as the consumer 
ventures out to fulfill his unattainable goals he becomes the easy prey of 
marketing efforts. In part, marketing is the art of deluding the consumer 
into trusting that unattainable goals are, in fact, achievable.7 Ownership and 
consumption hence become illusionary ends; products and services become 
substitutes used to mislead consumers into trusting that these were, in fact, 
their original objectives. Coupled with the quest for equality embedded in 
democracies, marketing instills in present-day consumers the misconceived 
pursuit to own or be anything. 
As democracy postulates equality, it puts everyone in a race towards the 
same. Undoubtedly, ownership and the market pricing system are an 
extension of one’s freedom (Locke 1689) but can the individual consumer 
(who votes for production of goods) see the whole truth?8  That is, does the 
consumer have the ability to see through the guile of marketing and discern 
what to buy and what to be?      
Marketing’s ability to amplify humans’ innate acquisitive nature and 
render all aspirations seemingly attainable creates a tyranny of the majority 
unimagined by De Tocqueville; everyone is salivating to belong to the next 
group or to purchase the new, new, new thing. Without digressing too 
much into concepts of the dictatorship of marketing, it seems that while art 
used to be a reflection of society, today, society is a reflection of 
marketing. The marketing of MOOCs to the millions will be the epitome of 
this irrational condition.  
MOOCs’ entry into this marketing and economic logic9 is nonsensical 
and dangerous.  Inevitably, in the hands of marketing oracles, the few elite 
institutions will impress upon potential students that (like the latest 
generation cell phone), if they desire an elite education, they should have it.  
MOOCs entry into the market represents a collision between the 
materialistic world and the world of reason; Plato’s philosopher kings 
moving into the sphere of appetite, and vice versa.  All with the help of 
marketing telling millions of potential students that which is contrary to 
nature: that they can all see the light.   
This logic increases the likelihood that in the aftermath of the predicted 
growth of MOOCs, few elite institutions will be left standing, therefore 
increasing the likelihood of a handful of professor instructing the millions.     
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6. Conclusion 
 
Democratic institutions are a manifestation of the people’s desire to 
progress towards a state where the ideas of the few are not imposed on the 
whole. The survival of democratic institutions relies on an open flow of 
diverse ideas and the critical analysis of the same. Critical thinking at its 
elemental level requires validation and refinement of a premise by the 
scrutiny of competing ideas.   
In absence of this conversation, that which is spewed from an elite 
group of persons will seldom be prodded and probed.  Such control of the 
few over the collective is the antithesis of democratic thought.  Presently, it 
can only be found in one place, religious dogma. Are Gods presently 
among men?  If not, the imposition of the interests of the few (including 
Public Status) on the collective is assured by the intoxicating combination 
of (1) the economic interests of Public Status, (2) consumer’s insatiable and 
irrational appetite for everything, (3) the marketing of the untrue idea that 
we can and should, in fact, have/be anything and (4) MOOCs.  
In the end, the foregoing arguments are self-substantiating, an 
attestation of the very perils they preach against; that is, in absence of 
dissenting opinions, they may be, disturbingly, left to stand. 
 
NOTES 
 
1. While the term MOOCs typically refers to single courses, in this article, the 
term is used to refer to single course offerings, multiple course offerings, and full 
degree offerings.    
2. “Right now, for the unbeatable price of $0, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology professor Anant Agarwal is teaching a class on circuits and electronics 
to thousands of people online – no MIT application required. Harvard, Princeton, 
Michigan, and other top schools have also started open courses for everyone” 
(Clark 2013). 
3. “The Great recession reduced the private institution’s endowments, reduced 
state support of public institutions and, most importantly, given the job market, 
made students question the value of higher education.  Arguably, ‘the enormous 
buzz about MOOCs is not due to the technology's intrinsic educational value, but 
due to the seductive possibilities of lower costs” (Vardi 2012). 
4. A topical example of the might of the intellectuals and their uncontrolled 
reputation is offered by the recently disproved economic theories of Harvard 
professors, Reinhart and Rogoff.  Leaders of several countries predicated their 
policies on these economists’ findings (Gods among men?), which were eventually 
disproven by a student, Thomas Herndon, from a non-ivy league university. 
Arguably, a Thomas Herndon is less likely to exist in a MOOCs infested world, 
where a handful of professors hold the reign to knowledge (Krugman 2013). 
5. But is it coming?  (Gardner and Young 2013).  
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6. The Karl Marx’s ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ argument? 
7. This note is no manner hoping to suggest that the discipline of marketing is 
exclusively devoted to this end.  Naturally, this discipline has brought society 
innumerable benefits, which are beyond of the scope of this note.  
8. Arguably, however, recently society and marketing are in better unison 
(Arvidisson and Giordano 2013).   
9. “It is not for the economist [or marketer], but the moralist and the 
philosopher to decide what kind of society we should deem desirable. An industrial 
society has one thing in abundance, and that is material welfare more than is good 
for it. If to uphold justice and freedom to restore meaning and unity in life, we 
should ever be called upon to sacrifice some efficiency in production, economy in 
consumption, or rationality of administration, an industrial civilization can afford it. 
The economic historians’ message to philosophers today should be: we can afford 
to be both just and free” (Polanyi 2013). 
   
REFERENCES 
 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).   
Arvidisson, A. & Giordano, A., eds. (2013).  Societing Reloaded. Pubblici 
Produttivi e Innovazione Sociale [Societing Reloaded. Production Publics and 
Social Innovation]. Milano: EGEA.   
Apple, M. W. and Beane, J. A., eds. (1995).   Democratic Schools, p.13.  
Alexandria, VA: ASCD.  
Bryce, V. J. (1995). The Uniformity of American Life - The American 
Commonwealth, vol. 2 (1888), p. 120. Ed. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.  
Clark, K. (2013). How To Get The Most Form MOOCs. Money Magazine, May 
2. http://schoolsofthought.blogs.cnn.com/2013/05/02/how-to-get-the-most-from-
moocs/. Accessed 3 May 2013.    
Cohan, P. (2012).  ‘Will edX put Harvard and MIT out of business?’ Forbes, 
May 6. http://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2012/05/06/will-edx-put-harvard-
and-mit-out-of-business/. Accessed 1 March 2013.  
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (per Harlan, J.). 
Cusumano, M. (2013). Strategy and Management Are the Costs of ‘Free’ Too 
High in Online Education? Considering the economic implications as educational 
institutions expand online learning initiatives.  Communications of the ACM, April.  
http://mitsloan.mit.edu/shared/ods/documents/High-Costs-of-Free-Online-
Education.pdf&PubID=5082.  Accessed 12 May 2013. 
Daniel, J.  (2012).  Making Sense of MOOCs: Musings in a Maze of Myth, 
Paradox and Possibility. Journal of Interactive Media Education.  http://www-
jime.open.ac.uk/jime/article/viewArticle/2012-18/html.  Accessed 12 April 2013. 
De Tocqueville, A. (1956).  Democracy in America.  Richard D. Heffner Ed., 
New York: Penguin Books Canada Ltd. 
Fini, A.  (2009). The Technological Dimension of a Massive Open Online 
Course: The Case of the CCK08 Course Tools. International Review of Research in 
Open and Distance Learning 10(5).  
 57
http://www.irrodl.org/index.php/irrodl/article/viewArticle/643.  Accessed February 
5, 2013) 
Gardner, L. and Young, J. R.  (2013). California's Move Toward MOOCs Sends 
Shock Waves, but Key Questions Remain Unanswered California Considers a Bold 
Remedy, but Details Are Scarce. The Chronicle of Higher Education. 
http://chronicle.com/article/California-Considers-a-Bold/137903.  Accessed 5 May 
2013. 
Gettell, R. G. (1949).  Political Science, p. 5.  Boston: Ginn and Co.  
Jaschik, S. (2013). MOOCs Skeptics at the Top.  Inside Higher Ed. 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/05/02/survey-finds-presidents-are-
skeptical-moocs.  Accessed 25 May 2013. 
Krugman, P.  (2013).  The 1 Percent’s Solution.  New York Times.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/opinion/krugman-the-one-percents-
solution.html?ref=paulkrugman&_r=0.  Accessed 25 May 2013.  
Lewin, T. (2013). Students Rush to Web Classes, but Profits May Be Much 
Later.  New York Times.  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/education/massive-
open-online-courses-prove-popular-if-not-lucrative-yet.html?pagewanted=all’.  
Accessed 13 May 2013.   
Locke, J. (1689). Two Treaties of Government. 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm.  Accessed 18 April 2013.   
Lohr, S. (2013). Beware of the High Cost of ‘Free’ Online Courses.  New York 
Times, March 3.  http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/beware-of-the-high-
cost-of-free-online-courses/.  Accessed 13 May 2013. 
Meiklejohn, A. (1948).  Free Speech And Its Relation To Self-Government, pp. 
18-19, 22-27.  http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/UW.MeikFreeSp.  Accessed 
13 May 2013. 
Meiklejohn, A. (1961). The First Amendment is an Absolute. 1961 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 245.  Accessed 18 April 2013 
Levy, O., ed. (1974). The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche. New York: 
The MacMillan Company, 152. 
Onink, T. (2013) Georgia Tech, Udacity Shock Higher Ed With $7,000 Degree. 
Forbes.  http://www.forbes.com/sites/troyonink/2013/05/15/georgia-tech-udacity-
shock-higher-ed-with-7000-degree/. Accessed 18 April 2013. 
Polanyi, K., (1919-1958). Per Un Nuovo Occidente, Scritti 1919-1958, p. 301, 
[For a New West, Writings 1919-1958].  Resta, G. and Catanzariti, M., eds., (2013). 
Milan: Il Saggiatore.  
Rampini, F. (2013). Le Fabbriche Delle Elite [The Factory of the Elite].  La 
Repubblica. 
http://rassegnastampa.unipi.it/rassegna/archivio/2013/05/14SIL2005.PDF.  
Accessed 14 May 2013.  
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (emphasis in 
original, citations omitted) (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).  
Tribe, L. H. (1988).  American Constitutional Law.  2nd edn., pp. 836-37.  
Mineola, New York: Foundation Press. 
Uphoff, N. T. & Warren, F. I. (1972), eds. The Political Economy of 
Development Theoretical and Empirical Contributions.  Berkeley, CA:  University 
of California Press.   
 58
Vardi, M. Y.  (2012). Will MOOCs Destroy Academia? Communications of the 
ACM, November.  http://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2012/11/156587-will-moocs-
destroy-academia/fulltext.  Accessed 12 May 2013.  
 
© Richard L. Pate 
